高端养老机构服务的价格形成能够提高社会福利吗？——基于Hotelling动态博弈模型的分析

Can the Price Formation of the Advance Aged Care Service Institutions Improve Social Welfare?——Analysis of Hotelling Dynamic Game Model

入住高端养老机构的老人是其养老金及积蓄足以支付高端养老机构收费的退休老年人群体,随着该老年群体的不断增大,该市场“供不应求”且存在垄断现象,老人处于相对弱势地位。为使高端养老服务市场健康发展,维护老人的基本权益,有必要研究其定价机制及社会福利。以双寡头高端养老服务机构为研究对象,建立两期Hotelling动态博弈模型,比较老人购买“免押金”保险入住和“押金”入住时的定价机制和社会福利,发现无论老人选择何种方式入住,养老机构均能获得超额利润,且老人购买“免押金”保险入住时,养老机构的盈利、老人福利和社会福利均明显增加。

Old people living in the advance aged care service institutions are the retirement pension group whose pension and savings are sufficient to cover the charges of the advance aged care service institutions.As the elderly group continues to grow,the market is “in short supply ” and there is a monopoly phenomenon.The elderly are in the relatively disadvantaged position.In order to make the market healthy and protect the basic rights of the elderly,it is necessary to study its pricing mechanism and social welfare.This paper takes advance aged care service institutions of the duopoly as the research object,establishes two Hotelling dynamic game models,compares the pricing mechanism and social welfare of the elderly when they buy “free deposit ” insurance and “wholesaling deposit ” insurance, finds that no matter how the elderly choose to stay,the aged care service institutions can obtain excess profits,and when the elderly buy the “free deposit” insurance,the profit of the old-age institutions,the welfare of the elderly and the social welfare have increased significantly.