摘要
上级地方政府的纵向财政竞争优势,使其具有实施转移支付资金截留行为的制度激励基础。利用2000—2017年我国省级政府的面板数据,实证分析了上级地方政府转移支付资金截留行为。研究发现,上级地方政府采取转移支付资金截留行为随本级财政收入的增加而减少,随本地区分配到的中央转移支付资金的增加而增加,上级地方政府采取的截留行为主要通过一般性转移支付实施。异质性地区的实证结果表明,财政资金净流出地区为了减少本地区财政资金的流出,上级地方政府会采取反截留的补贴措施,增加对省级以下地方政府的转移支付拨款。因此,为了减少转移支付资金截留行为,应加强对地方政府转移支付资金的监督管理,规范转移支付资金拨付渠道和使用程序;建立健全转移支付资金使用的监督问责机制,保护基层政府和弱势地区的资金分配权益;在合理划分纵向地方政府间事权支出责任的基础上,提高转移支付中分类拨款的比重。
Local superior governments have the ad vantag e of longitudinal financial competition, which makes them have the institutional incentive basis to withhold transfer payment funds. By making use of the panel data of China provincial governments from 2000 to 2017, this paper empirically analyzes the local superior governments5 behaviors to withhold the transfer payment funds. The findings show that the local superior governments, behavior of withholding the transfer payment funds will be decreased with the increase of fiscal revenue at the same level and will be increased with the increase of central government's transfer payment allocated to the local areas. The interception behavior taken by the local superior government is mainly implemented through general transfer payments. The empirical findings of the heterogeneous regions show that in order to reduce the outflow of local financial funds from the net financial funds outflow regions, the local superior governments will adopt anti-interception subsidy measures to increase the transfer payment to governments below the provincial level. Therefore, in order to reduce the withholding behavior of transfer payment funds, it is necessary to strengthen the supervision and management of local governments' transfer payments, standardize the funding channels and usage procedures of the transfer payment funds, establish and perfect the oversight and accountability mechanisms for the use of transfer payments, protect the rights and interests of local grass-root governments and vulnerable areas in allocating funds, and increase the proportion of classified allocation in transfer payments on the basis of reasonably dividing the responsibilities of vertical inter-govemmental expenditures.
作者
束磊
付文林
SHU Lei;FU Wen-lin(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China)
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第10期25-35,共11页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“中国的政府间事权与支出责任划分研究”(16ZDA065)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“转移支付制度与地方财政行为:激励效应与机制重构”(71373150)
上海财经大学研究生创新基金(CXJJ-2015-401)
关键词
上级地方政府
转移支付
资金截留行为
支出责任下移
local superior government
transfer payment
fund withhold
downward shift of ex penditure responsibility