法律诉讼、政治关系与银行贷款契约——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Company Lawsuits, Political Connections and Bank Loan Contracting, Empirical Evidence from Private Listed Companies in China

本文以2010~2017年A股上市民营企业为样本,实证研究了在政治关系的调节效应下法律诉讼对银行贷款契约的影响。结果发现:(1)公司法律诉讼对银行贷款契约产生负面影响且这种影响随诉讼强度的增大而增大;(2)公司高管的政治关系对银行贷款契约产生正面影响且这种影响随政治关系强度的增大而增大;(3)高管的政治关系会减轻公司法律诉讼对银行贷款契约的负面影响,且这种减轻作用随着政治关系强度的增大而增大。与以往研究不同,本文将正式机制与非正式机制结合,一方面说明建立政治关系这一非正式机制可以作为企业防范法律风险的有效途径,另一方面为政策制定者如何通过正式机制和非正式机制博弈达到利益最大化提供参考。

Based upon the research sample of Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2017,thispaper investigates the relationship among the company lawsuits, political connections and the bank loan contracting. The results show that:(1) the company lawsuit has a negative effect on bank loan contracting, which increases with the increase of the litigation intensity;(2) the political connections have positive effects on bank loan contracting,which increases with the increase of political relationship strength;(3) the political connections will reduce the negative impact of lawsuit proceedings on bank loan contracting, and this effect will increase with the increase of the strength of political relationship. Different from previous studies, this paper combines formal mechanism with informal mechanism. On the one hand, it shows that the informal mechanism of establishing political relations can be an effective way for enterprises to prevent lawsuit risks;on the other hand, it provides a reference for policy makers to maximize their interests through the game between formal mechanism and informal mechanism.