胡塞尔的“纯粹逻辑学”纲领及其意义——论《逻辑研究》第一卷中的逻辑哲学思想

Husserl’s Program of Pure Logic and Its Significances On the Philosophy of Logic in the First Volume of Logical Investigations

胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》第一卷不仅对于现象学的发展意义重大,同时也作为一部独立的逻辑哲学著作参与到 20 世纪初的逻辑哲学发展中。胡塞尔基于对传统逻辑的反思,提出了“纯粹逻辑学”的构想,它主要包含了两个方面:首先是重新确立逻辑学的纯粹性、独立性和非经验性,反对心理学主义的解读;其次,确定逻辑学处理的对象类型、对象间关系类型以及理想中的理论结构形态。这两方面平行于从弗雷格到希尔伯特的逻辑哲学发展过程,前者表明了新时代的逻辑学如何在根本上超越了传统的观点,后者则最终导向了现象学哲学。这也意味着20世纪初的逻辑哲学与某种彻底的认识论研究之间存在着结合点。

The first volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations is very important to the development of phenomenology, and it also takes a role in the prosperity of philosophy of logic in the beginning of 20th century. Husserl’s conception of a pure logic has two aspects, the first of which has claimed independency and nonempiricality for logic, while the second elaborates on the type of logical objects and their relations as well as the complete form of the theoretical structure of logic. The second aspect finally leads to the scheme of a phenomenological study, thus it implies that there is a transition point from the philosophy of logic in question to a deeper and more radical epistemology.