儒家正义理论如何可能？

How Confucian Justice Theory to Be Possible?

《共同的善与全球贫困的伦理学:一种儒家视角》一文凸显了缺失平等权利观念的儒家伦理的狭隘及特权的本性,即儒家“超越等差之爱”的“仁”的“推扩”本能地产生了一种狭隘的自我封闭,形成了一个在亲缘、亲密关系范围内的环形回路,对外界个体产生了屏蔽。儒家的“仁”与权利观念并非相互排斥,而是可以共存的,所需要的是界定二者各自运行的空间。在非道德领域及拥有相同道德权重的境况下,运用儒家的“仁”,即亲缘、亲密关系的优先性,对家庭、亲戚和朋友关系成员的诉求优先满足是可允许的。这是儒家“仁”的运行空间。在拥有不同道德权重的境况中,主体的选择需要优先满足道德权重较大一方的道德诉求。这是权利的运行空间。

Jonathan Chan’s essay on Common Good and the Ethics of Global Poverty: A Confucian Perspective magnifies the substantive characteristics of Confucian ethic, lacking the notion of equality right, is parochial and prerogative;viz. the extension of Confucian“ ren”(paralleling to“ beneficence” or“ charity”), named“ beyond differentiated love”, intrinsically produces parochialism, which forms a cycle limited by blood relationship and friendship that rules out the individuals to whom do not belong. In my opinion, Confucian“ ren” does not exclude the notion of equality, but rather coexisted if we can distribute their own workable spaces. Confucian“ ren” takes effect in non-moral scope and the situation of equal weight of moral significance, that is, it is permissible to empowers preferentially to fulfil the needs of relationship and friendship, while empowering preferentially to the one whose suffering has more morally significance under the situation, providing with different moral weight, that the space rights and moral weight take effect.