摘要
以穆勒为代表的逻辑心理主义与以弗雷格为代表的反心理主义之间的争论由来已久。逻辑心理主义认为,逻辑是心理学的一部分或是其分支,具有描述性;反心理主义则认为,应当把心理的东西从逻辑中剔除,逻辑只是规范性的。信念修正理论虽具有规范性特质,但是当信念状态层级从低层级走向高层级时,其规范性解释力度则会降低,这表明信念状态的改变会受到经验描述的影响,信念修正理论研究有从规范性走向描述性的层级区分。信念修正理论一定程度上能为弱逻辑心理主义在逻辑中的合法性提供支持,并将心理主义与反心理主义聚焦在人即主体上。
The argument between logical psychologism represented by Mill and anti-psychologism represented by Frege has continued for a long time. Psychologism holds that logic is a part or branch of psychology;it is descriptive. Anti-Psychologims argues that psychological things should be excluded from logic, which is only normative. Although the belief revision theory has normative characteristics, its normative explaining power will be reduced when the belief state hierarchy moves from low level to high level. It indicates that the change of belief state will be affected by the experience description. The theory of belief revision could support the weak logical psychologism, and it could put psychologism and anti-psychologism on the subject of human.
出处
《哲学分析》
CSSCI
2019年第5期139-152,199,共15页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划一般课题“逻辑心理主义及其信念修正研究”（项目编号：2018BZX003）的阶段成果
