摘要
以2004至2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了公司内部治理、代理成本对非效率投资的影响。研究结果表明,经理与外部股东的代理冲突所产生的代理成本对过度投资存在显著影响,但代理成本对投资不足的影响不显著;股权治理、董事会治理和高管激励总体上未能有效发挥公司治理作用,抑制过度投资。
Taking A-share listed companies in China from 2004 to 2018 as samples,this paper investigates the impact of corporate internal governance and agency costs on inefficient investment.The results show that the agency cost caused by the conflict between managers and external shareholders has a significant impact on overinvestment,but the agency cost has no significant impact on underinvestment;equity governance,board governance and executive incentives generally fail to play an effective role in corporate governance and restrain overinvestment.
作者
陈映珊
叶嘉欣
CHEN Ying-shan;YE Jia-xin(School of Business and Management,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)
出处
《价值工程》
2019年第30期4-7,共4页
Value Engineering
关键词
代理成本
公司治理
过度投资
投资不足
agency cost
corporate governance
overinvestment
underinvestment
