薪酬差距、产权性质与投资效率

Pay Gap,Nature of Property Right and Investment Efficiency

高管作为公司治理中的主要决策者,对公司发展至关重要,薪酬水平也日益见高,但目前我国企业非效率投资问题严重,高薪没有对管理层起到有效激励。文中基于锦标赛理论以及与前者结论相反的行为理论,选取A股市场“软件信息服务行业”2013—2017年的83家公司数据为样本,采用多元非线性回归方法,对高管团队内部薪酬差距会对公司的投资效率产生怎样的影响进行了研究。研究发现:薪酬不平等对企业投资效率的影响效应呈现“倒U型”。在薪酬差距较小时,随着薪酬差距的增大,企业投资效率也逐渐变高,然而当差距过大时,企业的投资效率又会降低;进一步研究发现,这种现象在非国有企业中更为显著,在国有企业中这种关系被其他因素稀释。文中丰富了企业薪酬体系市场化建设的研究,对减缓代理成本、提升企业投资效率、国有企业薪酬改革有一定的参考意义。

As the main decision-maker in corporate governance,senior managers play an important role in the development of the company and their salary level is getting higher and higher.However,at present,the problem of inefficient investment in Chinese enterprises is serious,and high salary has not effectively stimulated the management.Based on the championship theory and the behavioral theory which is contrary to the former conclusion,this paper chooses 83 companies in the software information service industry of A-share market from 2013 to 2017 as samples and adopts the multivariate nonlinear regression method to study how the pay gap within the executive team affects the investment efficiency of the company.The study finds that the effect of pay inequality on corporate investment efficiency is“inverted U-shaped”.When the pay gap is small,the investment efficiency of enterprises will gradually become higher with the increase of the pay gap.However,when the gap is too big,the investment efficiency of enterprises will decrease.Further research found that this phenomenon is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.To be significant,this relationship is diluted by other factors in state-owned enterprises.This paper enriches the research on the marketization construction of enterprise pay system,and has certain reference significance for mitigating agency cost,improving enterprise investment efficiency and state-owned enterprise salary reform.