营运资本对创新投资的平滑机制:基于代理问题视角的分析

Smoothing Mechanism of Working Capital for Innovation Investment: Analysis Based on the Perspective of Agency Problem

本文基于代理问题的情境视角,检验营运资本对创新投资波动的平滑机制。通过2007~2015年我国制造业上市公司面板数据的实证结果发现:企业的持续性创新投资活动存在外部融资约束,而营运资本有利于缓解融资约束并平滑创新投资的波动,企业会通过削减营运资本来维持创新投资。另外大小股东之间的代理问题会弱化这种平滑机制,对大股东股权的制衡有利于减轻代理问题从而加强营运资本的平滑效应。进一步研究表明,当宏观经济增长放缓时,外部融资约束增强,企业的创新可持续性受到冲击,这时企业通过营运资本来平滑创新投资的作用会更加凸显。

Based on agency problems from situational perspective, this paper tests the smoothing mechanism of working capital on innovation investment volatility. Through the empirical study of panel data of manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2015, we find there are external financing constraints in the sustainable investment activities of enterprises, working capital helps ease financing constraints and smooth the volatility of innovation investments. Firms will maintain innovative investment by cutting operating capital.In addition,the agency problem between minority shareholders weakens this smoothing mechanism. The balance of ownership of major shareholders help to reduce agency problems, thereby enhancing the smoothing effect of working capital. Finally, through further study we have found that with the external macroeconomic slowdowns, the external financing constraints first enhance and then strengthen the smoothing mechanism of working capital.