企业政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响——激励机制与监督机制的调节作用

Impact of Political Connections onVenture Capital Strategy——The Moderating Effects of Incentive-based Mechanisms and Monitoring-based Mechanisms

从资金需求方出发,以2009年10月至2016年12月深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的公司为样本,实证检验了政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响,以及激励机制和监督机制这两种公司治理机制的调节作用,得到结论如下:政治关联企业倾向于在发展后期引入风险投资;政治关联企业倾向于选择国有性质、经验丰富以及参与程度高的风险投资机构;激励机制会加强政治关联企业在发展后期引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿;监督机制会减弱政治关联企业在发展后期阶段引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿。结论对拓展政治关联与风险投资领域的理论和实践具有重要启示意义。

From the perspective of capital demander,we use the data of Chinese Growth Enterprise Market listed companies and the data of listed companies in SEM board from October 2009 to December 2016.This article empirically analyzes the impact of political connections on venture capital strategy.The moderating effects of different governance mechanisms are further explored. The results show:(1) Politically connected enterprises tend to choose venture capital at a later stage.(2)Politically connected enterprises tend to choose the syndication investment and the staged investment.(3)Politically connected enterprises tend to choose state-backed,experienced and higher involvement venture capitals.(4)incentive-based mechanisms positively modifes the relation between political connection and venture capital strategy.(5)monitoring-based mechanisms negatively modifes the relation between political connection and venture capital strategy.This study has important implications for the development of the theory and practice of political connection and venture capital.