超越“反公地困局”——城市更新中的机制设计与规划应对

BEYOND “PREDICAMENT OF ANTI-COMMONS”: MECHANISM DESIGN AND PLANNING RESPONSE IN URBAN RENEWAL

1990年代以来,中国城市通过建立土地征收-出让制度,极大地推动了工业化和城镇化的发展.随着城市边界不断扩张,农村宅基地被绕开以及大量外来人口中的中低收入人群的住房需求,共同刺激了大批城中村的出现.近年来,出于追求经济利益与提升城市形象的目的,政府试图加快城中村改造与城市更新,但常常推进缓慢,加剧社会矛盾.本研究引入“反公地困局”的概念及相关理论对目前城中村改造的困境进行分析,将其归纳为民间频发性“钉子户”导致的“漫天要价类反公地困局”,以及政府常态性“多机构管制”所带来的“九龙治水类反公地困局”;并提出未来需要通过两步博弈的机制设计来重设拆迁谈判机制,有效遏制“钉子户困局”,同时通过“放权简政”式的规划体制创新来全面破解“多机构管制困局”.

Since the 1990s, industrialization and urbanization of China have been boosted very fast through an institutionalized land expropriation and leasing system. A lot of urban villages appeared driven by various elements including the constant expansion of city border, the circumvention around rural homestead, and the housing demand by medium- and low-income group in the large number of migrant population. In recent years, in order to pursue economic ben efits and promote city image, government of cities tried to accelerate the urban village redevelopment and urban renewal, but only resulting in slow progress and deepened social conflicts. The authors introduce the concept of "predicament of anti-commons" and related theory to explain the predicament in urban planning renewal, which can be summarized as "the anticommons predicament of wild speculation" by "nail households" in different areas and "the anti-commons predicament of too many leaders" caused by comm only existing "multi-department management" by government. The paper proposes a two-step game mechanism design accompanied with a simplification of urban renewal approval process to address the serious challenges in China's urban village redevelopment and urban renewal.