财政体制失衡抑制了地方政府税收努力吗?

Does the Fiscal System Imbalance Inhibit Local Government Tax Efforts?

本文首先尝试构建一个同时包含发达与欠发达两个地区规模报酬递减的柯布道格拉斯生产函数模型与理论分析框架,系统诠释财政纵向失衡与横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的作用渠道与影响效应;其次通过建立面板联立方程模型与采取三阶段最小二乘法实证考察财政纵向失衡与横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的影响效应,发现财政纵向失衡无论是从全国层面抑或分地区均显著降低地方政府税收努力程度,而财政横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的影响则存在显著的地区异质性。在这之后,本文通过对面板联立方程模型进行标准化回归估计进一步考察了财政纵向失衡与横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的作用渠道与传导效应,发现财政纵向失衡通过直接作用渠道显著降低或抑制了地方政府税收努力;而财政横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的作用渠道与传导效应大小因地区经济发展水平不同而存在较大差异,即发达地区财政横向失衡直接提高地方政府税收努力,而欠发达地区财政横向失衡不仅可以直接降低地方政府税收努力,亦可通过对财政纵向失衡的正向激励间接影响地方政府税收努力产生负向抑制效应。

In light of the new economic normal of declining demographic and resource dividends, China now faces the problem of rebuilding the mechanism of dynamic growth by comprehensively deepening the fiscal and tax reforms to provide an institutional basis for promoting high-quality economic development. In this regard, developing a new fiscal relationship between the central and local governments, establishing clear political powers and responsibilities, and coordinating financial resources and the regional equilibrium are key to both accelerating the establishment of a modern fiscal system and promoting the modernization of the national system of governance. Thus far, although domestic scholars have increasingly focused on the vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI), they continue to neglect the horizontal fiscal imbalances (HFI) and rarely use the same theoretical framework to investigate them. Therefore, in this paper, we build a theoretical model that includes both VFI and HFI, and we theoretically and empirically clarify and investigate the differences between the imbalances in China's fiscal system and the tax efforts of local governments. First, we construct a Cobb-Douglas function model that includes developed and developing regions to theoretically illustrate the effects and channels of the VFI and HFI on the taxation efforts of local governments. We also propose two research hypotheses:(1) VFI directly reduce the tax efforts of local governments, which implies a direct impact path of “VFI→tax efforts”;and (2) HFI not only directly affect the tax efforts of the governments of developed regions but also indirectly reduce the tax revenue efforts of local governments by increasing the VFI in developing regions. Second, we establish a panel simultaneous equation model and use 3SLS to examine the hypotheses derived from our theoretical models. We find that the VFI significantly reduce the local government tax efforts at the national and sub-regional levels. However, the HFI show regional differences in the effects of the local government tax efforts. To further study the action channels and effect sizes of the VFI and HFI on the local government tax efforts, we conduct standardized regression estimations of the benchmark model. The results show that the VFI significantly inhibit the tax revenue efforts of local governments through direct channels of action, while the effect of the HFI on the tax revenue efforts of local governments varies greatly depending on the level of regional economic development. That is, the HFI in developed regions directly improve the tax efforts of the local governments, while the HFI in developing regions not only directly reduce the local government tax efforts, but have an indirectly negative effect on the local government tax efforts through providing positive incentives for VFI. In addition, the inhibiting effect of VFI on the local government tax efforts is significantly stronger than that of the HFI at the national level. Our findings have a number of policy implications. First, to deepen the reforms of the fiscal and tax systems, the powers and expenditure responsibilities of central and local governments should be divided on a scientific basis. Moreover, more effective and improved modes of supervision need to be implemented. Second, the government needs to promote balanced regional development strategies and the equalization of basic public services between regions. Third, the government also needs to build a long-term incentive and restraint mechanism to encourage local governments to improve their tax efforts to a level suitable for the development of the regions. Lastly, the transfer payment structure needs to be optimized under the scientific design of the transfer payment system. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we build a theoretical analytical framework that includes both VFI and HFI, and we systematically illustrate the channels and effects of VFI and HFI on the taxation efforts of local governments. Second, we explore the relationship between the imbalance in the fiscal system and the tax revenue efforts of local governments by reconstructing the index approach to measuring fiscal imbalance and establishing a panel simultaneous equation model.