内部控制质量与高管超额薪酬

Internal Control Quality and Executives’ Overpayment

现有关于内部控制的研究鲜有关注其能否有效约束高管获得超额薪酬的机会主义行为。鉴于此,本文以2005-2017年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证研究内部控制质量与高管超额薪酬之间的关系和作用机制,以及产权性质和产品市场竞争的调节作用。结果表明,公司内部控制质量越高,高管超额薪酬水平越低;相较于民营企业,地方国有企业中内部控制质量对高管超额薪酬的抑制作用更大,但未有证据表明在中央企业中也存在上述关系;产品市场竞争正向促进内部控制质量对高管超额薪酬的抑制作用。机制检验发现,提高内部控制质量有助于约束管理层权力和打破任人唯亲的董事会文化,从而降低高管超额薪酬。这一结论为上市公司强化内部控制建设提供了经验证据和政策参考。

Existing studies concerning internal control concern little about whether it can effectively constrain executives' opportunistic behavior of obtaining overpayment. In view of this, this paper explores the impact and mechanism of internal control quality on executives' overpayment as well as the moderating effect of corporate ownership and product market competition by employing data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2017. Results show: internal control quality negatively affects the executives' overpayment. Compared with private firms, the internal control quality has a greater inhibitory effect on executives' overpayment in local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while there's no evidence showing the above negative correlation also exists in central SOEs. Product market competition positively moderates the inhibiting effect of internal control quality on executives' overpayment. Mechanism test shows that improving internal control quality helps to constrain management power and break the board culture of cronyism, thereby reducing the executives' overpayment. The results provide empirical evidence and policy reference for strengthening internal control in Chinese listed companies.