业绩期望落差对高管超额薪酬的抑制作用——基于不同期望参照标准的检验

The Inhibition Effect of Performance Expectation Gap on Executive′s Excess Pay: A Test based on Different Expected Reference Standards

本文以2009-2017年的数据探究业绩期望落差对高管超额薪酬的影响,研究表明,业绩期望落差对高管超额薪酬具有抑制作用,其中:行业和历史两种参照标准下的期望落差对超额薪酬的抑制强度有所不同,前者强于后者;行业参照标准下的行业期望落差对高管超额薪酬的抑制作用不因高管权力大小而改变,历史参照标准下的历史期望落差在高管权力较大时对高管超额薪酬的抑制作用不再显著。以上结果在考虑期望落差的持续性和范围性之后仍然成立。由于行业参照标准下的行业期望落差对高管超额薪酬的抑制作用强度更强,且受高管权力大小的影响不明显,故制定高管薪酬时优先考虑行业业绩期望更能满足利益相关者的要求。

Based on the data of 2009-2017, this paper explores the impact of performance expectation gap on executive excess pay. Among them, industry and history under the two reference standards of expectation gap on the intensity of excess compensation is different, the former is stronger than the latter;under the industry reference standard, the inhibition effect of industry expectation gap on executive excess pay does not change because of executive power,and under the historical reference standard, the inhibition effect on executive excess pay is no longer significant when executive power is strong. The above results are still valid after considering the persistence and scope of expectation gap. Because the industry expectation gap under the industry reference standard has a stronger inhibition on the excess compensation of senior executives, and the influence of senior executives power is not obvious, the priority of industry performance expectation in the formulation of senior executives′ compensation can better meet the requirements of stakeholders.