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基于SDN节点淆乱机制的接收方不可追踪的混合匿名通道 被引量:4

Hybrid anonymous channel for recipient untraceability via SDN-based node obfuscation scheme
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摘要 针对以Tor为代表的匿名通信系统在时延和下载时间方面的用户体验不够理想的问题,利用新一代软件定义网络带来的优势,面向接收方不可追踪,设计了新的匿名解决方案。提出使用SDN域内淆乱的方法,构建基于Tor和SDN的混合匿名通道,提供发送方和接收方匿名,拓展了Tor匿名通道的纵深,有效降低了攻击者对匿名路径的追踪率。实验结果表明,相比Tor,所提方案在增加15%时延的代价下,可提供相当于2条Tor电路的抗追踪能力。 Leveraging the advantages of software defined networking (SDN),a new anonymous communication solution was de-signed for recipient untraceability.An obfuscation scheme in SDN domain was proposed to build a hybrid anonymous channel to solve the problem of large and highly variable delays and download time when using existing anonymous com-munication system such as Tor.The hybrid anonymous channel concatenated two sender anonymous channels in Tor and SDN to provide both sender and receiver anonymity.Adversaries can trace smaller portions of the path in hybrid channel.Experimental results show that the hybrid channel is as anonymous as two connected Tor circuits,with only a small larger latency (15%) compared with Tor.
作者 赵蕙 王良民 ZHAO Hui;WANG Liangmin(School of Computer Science and Communication Engineering,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处 《通信学报》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第10期55-66,共12页 Journal on Communications
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.U1736216,No.61702233)Founda~~
关键词 匿名通信 软件定义网络 混合通道 淆乱节点 anonymous communication SDN hybrid channel obfuscated node
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