奖惩机制下政府监管与制造商回收的演化博弈分析

Research on the Government Regulation and Manufacturer Recovery under Premium and Penalty Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

基于演化博弈理论,分别建立静态奖惩与动态奖惩机制下的政府监管与制造商回收博弈模型,研究双方行为策略的互动机制,并分析政府奖惩力度、回收难度系数与政府实施监管成本对政府与制造商行为策略的影响,最后进行算例与仿真分析。研究结果表明,动态奖惩机制下的政府与制造商的行为策略能有效地解决静态奖惩机制下约束条件限制的行为策略不稳定问题,实现政府监管与制造商回收策略的演化稳定。政府实施监管的概率与奖惩力度成反比,与政府实施监管的成本成反比,与回收难度系数成正比;制造商选择积极回收的概率与奖惩力度成正比,与政府实施监管的成本成反比。

This paper established respectively the governments and manufacturers behavioral strategies game model under the static premium-penalty mechanism and the dynamic premium-penalty mechanism based on the Evolutionary Game theory, and then explored the interaction mechanisms of the behavioral strategies on both sides. It analyzed the influence of the upper limit of reward-penalty intensity, the cost of governmental supervision, and the recovery difficulty coefficient on the government regulation and manufacturers recovery strategies. Furthermore, it analyzed the numerical examples and simulation. Results indicated that the government regulation and manufacturers recovery strategy under the dynamic premium-penalty mechanism can effectively solve the unstable problem of behavioral strategy generated by the static premium-penalty mechanism and realize the evolutionary stable strategy of government and manufacturer behavioral strategies. The possibility of governmental supervision is inversely proportional to the upper limit of premium-penalty intensity and is inversely proportional to the cost of governmental supervision, which is directly proportional to the recovery difficulty coefficient. The possibility of the manufacturers choosing to actively recycle is directly proportional to the upper limit of the premium-penalty intensity and is inversely proportional to the cost of governmental supervision.