政府补助如何影响高管薪酬及高管薪酬—业绩敏感性——基于混合寡头市场模型的理论与实证分析

How does Government Subsidy Affect Executive’s Pay and Executive’s Pay-performance Sensitivity:Theoretical and Empirical Analysis Based on Mixed Oligopoly Market Model

本文构建混合寡头市场模型并以我国上市公司2003-2015年的数据为样本,对政府补助如何影响高管薪酬及高管薪酬-业绩敏感性这一问题进行理论与实证分析。结果表明,政府补助会显著提升混合所有制企业和民营企业的高管薪酬,但会降低混合所有制企业和民营企业的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性;进一步研究发现,相比于混合所有制企业,民营企业的高管具有更加强烈的薪酬辩护动机和需求。本文初步实现了产业组织理论与公司金融理论交叉领域的研究,弥补了既有文献普遍缺乏理论模型的研究局限,对政府部门分配政府补助资源、制定相关监督政策以及企业内部强化制度建设、完善高管薪酬契约设计等均具有一定的实践指导价值。

This paper constructs a mixed oligopoly market model and employs data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2015 as samples to theoretically and empirically analyze how government subsidies affect executive’s pay and executive’s pay-performance sensitivity.The results show that there is a significantly positive correlation between government subsidy and the executive’s pay of mixed-ownership and private-owned enterprises.However,the government subsidy would reduce the executive’s pay-performance sensitivity of both types of enterprises.Further study suggests that,compared with mixed-ownership enterprises,executives of private-owned enterprises have stronger incentives and demands for compensation defense.This article initially achieved the cross-domain research of industrial organization theory and corporate finance, which not only makes up for the limitations of the existing literature on corporate finance that generally lack theoretical basis, but also provides some practical guidance value for government departments to allocate government subsidy resources perfectly,formulate relevant supervision policies and for companies to strengthen the internal system construction,improve the executive compensation contract design.