非国有大股东与国企内部薪酬差距

Non-state-owned Blockholders and Pay Gap in SOEs

近年来,引入非国有资本进行混合所有制改革是国企改革的重要方向之一,而创造充分的竞争环境是改善国企经营绩效的关键。本文尝试融合产权理论与竞争理论,利用1999-2017年A股国有上市公司样本,从非国有大股东的角度探究混合所有制改革对国企锦标赛机制的影响。本文的研究发现,非国有大股东提高了国企内部薪酬差距及其业绩激励效应,并且该正向治理作用随着非国有大股东相对力量的增强而提高。进一步研究发现,非国有大股东的促进作用在高竞争行业国企和地方国企以及“限薪令”后更为显著,且主要通过提髙高管的薪酬溢价扩大内部薪酬差距。本文研究支持了非国有大股东对锦标赛激励的正向作用,为提升混合所有制改革效果提供了新的思路。

In recent years, the reform of mixed property rights system with non-state-owned capital has become the main direction of the reform of state-owned enterprises, while creating a sufficient competitive environment is the key to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Using the sample of A-share SOEs from 1999 to 2017, this paper attempts to integrate the theory of property rights reform and competition, and explore the impact of mixed ownership structure on the SOEs' tournament mechanism from the perspective of state-owned blockholders. This paper finds that non-state-owned blockholders have increased the pay gap and performance incentive effect in state-owned enterprises, and the positive promotion effect increases with the increase of relative power of non-state-owned blockholders. Further research finds that the promotive role of non-state-owned blockholders is more significant in competitive state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises after the "pay limit order" in 2009, and the pay gap is widened mainly by increasing the pay premium of senior executives. This study supports the positive effect of non- state-owned blockholders on the incentive effect of the tournament, and provides a new perspective for the test of the effect of mixed ownership reform and the governance of the inefficiency of stateowned enterprises.