柏拉图哲学中的信念(Doxa)难题

The Doxa-problem in Plato’s Philosophy

柏拉图哲学中的信念(doxa)概念存在着不确定性,以致人们在翻译和理解时会遇到困难,这就是“信念难题”。论文在施普鲁特(J Sprute)工作的基础上梳理了西方学界关于信念难题的种种解决方案,并提出了他的解释,即认为柏拉图的信念可以泛指判断或认之为真,而认之为真还可能从两方面得到限定:一方面在于它的来源和根据是感知,这时它表示与理性认识相区分的感性认识,另一方面在于它缺乏充分的客观根据但又被认知者视为在客观上是充分的,这时它成了臆见或伪知识。这种解释不仅能说明柏拉图信念概念的复杂性,也能较好地解决信念与知识的排斥论和兼容论之间的冲突。

The concept of belief (doxa) in Plato's philosophy is so uncertain that it leads to considerable confusion in translation and understanding-a situation summed up as " the Doxa-problem." Benefiting from the work of J. Sprute, a new interpretation of the Doxa-problem emerges on the basis of various solutions proposed in Western scholarship. In general, the Platonic concept of doxa can be recognized as judgment or taking-to-be-true, which may be defined in two ways. On the one hand, based on sense-perception, doxa refers to the sensory knowledge that is contrary to rational understanding. On the other hand, it lacks sufficient objective ground but is sufficiently recognizable to the knower, and thus serves as pseudo-knowledge. This interpretation can not only explain the complexity of the Platonic concept of doxa, but also resolve the conflict between exclusive and inclusive readings of the Platonic concepts of belief and knowledge.