股权激励与过度投资:激励力度的门槛效应

Equity Incentive and Overinvestment: The Threshold Effect of Incentive Intensity

理论上,股权激励能够缓解代理问题,达到抑制过度投资的目的,但实证中,不同研究者的研究结论却存在诸多分歧。笔者以2012-2016年A股上市公司为样本,从管理者主观感知的激励力度视角出发,利用面板门槛效应模型,实证检验了股权激励对过度投资的非线性影响。研究结果表明:影响股权激励力度的管理层持股水平、管理层货币薪酬水平以及企业业绩,均对股权激励的过度投资抑制作用存在单门槛效应;只有在管理层持股水平低于门槛值、管理层货币薪酬水平高于门槛值、企业业绩(净资产收益率)高于门槛值时,股权激励才能有效发挥其抑制过度投资的作用。为设计更好的激励机制,笔者提出了相应的政策建议。

In theory, equity incentive can alleviate agency problem, thus inhibite excessive investment behavior. But in the empirical perspective, different researchers have different conclusions.Taking A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as samples, we start from the perspective of managers’ subjective perception of incentive strength,using the panel threshold effect model,the authors empirically examine the non-linear effects of equity incentive on overinvestment.The results show that: the management shareholding level, the management monetary compensation level and the enterprise performance all have the single threshold effect on the overinvestment inhibition of equity incentive;only when the shareholding level of the management is lower than the threshold value, the natural logarithm of monetary compensation level of the management is higher than the threshold value, and the corporate performance(ROE) is higher than the threshold value, equity incentive can play an effective role in restraining overinvestment.In order to design a better incentive mechanism, the authors put forward some policy suggestions.