论“颜色悖论”作为一个逻辑悖论

On “color paradox” as a logical paradox

以"红""黄""蓝"为代表的颜色谓词是典型的模糊谓词。"颜色悖论"是以莱布尼茨"不可分辨者的同一"和"同一不可分辨"为原则推导出的悖谬,具有深刻的逻辑哲学意蕴。"颜色悖论"探讨了个体事物包含的部分与部分之间的模糊关系,它与连锁悖论类似,但又不完全等同。对于"颜色悖论"的分析与解构具有重要的理论价值。

The color predicate represented by "red","yellow"and "blue"is a typical vague predicate.The "color paradox"is based on Leibniz’s "identity of indiscernibles"and "indiscernibility of identicals",which has profound implications of philosophy of logic. The "color paradox"explores the vague relationship between the parts and parts of individual things. It is similar to,but not completely equivalent to,the sorites paradox. Therefore,the analysis and deconstruction of "color paradox"has a strong theoretical value.