连锁董事、信用议价能力与企业双维绩效——来自2003～2016年中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

Interlocking Directors, Bargaining Power and Two-dimensional Performance of Enterprises——Evidence from Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies in 2003-2016

本文利用中国制造业上市公司的商业信用数据构造了信用议价能力指标,研究了信用议价能力对企业双维绩效①的影响,并探究了连锁董事网络对这一影响的调节作用。研究发现,信用议价能力与企业长、短期绩效均呈现倒U型关系,且因制度环境与市场环境的不同而存在异质性;连锁董事网络特征中,结构洞对长期绩效关系具有正向调节作用;加权中心度和中介中心度则对短期绩效关系具有反向调节作用。进一步研究发现,高风险水平抑制了企业的信用议价能力,而连锁董事网络具有隐性担保作用,部分消除了这一影响。研究表明,我国企业应审慎运用商业信用,宜优化连锁董事网络,以提高非正式制度的担保与监督作用。

This paper studies the impact of the credit bargaining power on two-dimensional performance, and explores the moderating effect of the chain directors network on this impact. It is found that the relationship between the credit bargaining power and the performance is inverted U-shaped, and heterogeneity exists due to different institutional and market environments. In the characteristics of chain directors' network, structural holes have a positive moderating effect on the long-term performance, whereas betweenness centrality and weighted centrality have a negative effect on the short-term performance of enterprises. Further research finds that the high risk level restrains the credit bargaining ability of enterprises, and the chain directors network has an implicit guarantee effect, partly eliminating the impact of the risk level. This study shows that Chinese enterprises should use the commercial credit occupancy prudently and optimize the chain directors network to improve the guarantee and supervision function of the informal system.