不平衡报价背景下甲方代理的博弈分析

Game Analysis of First Party A’s Agent under the Background of Unbalanced Quotation

在公共工程项目中工程量变更过程和审计人员的审计过程存在着行为博弈。乙方在工程量变更中利用不平衡报价概率与甲方代理人未能识别不平衡报价的成本节约y正相关,与甲代接受贿赂金额、因甲代识别出不平衡报价或与乙方合谋国有资产资金承担的或有损失h2、因甲代识别出工程量变更利用不平衡报价而带来的未来收益x负相关。甲方代理人与乙方合谋公共资产资金的概率与甲方代理人收受的贿赂金额、审计成本正相关,与审计人员查处问题获得的激励负相关。为防范工程项目中甲方代理人与乙方合谋谋取公共资产资金,可以从甲方代理人的聘请、审计人员的素质、加大对审计人员查处激励等方面入手。

There is a behavioral game in the engineering quantity change process and the auditor's audit process in public engineering projects.Party B's use of the unbalanced quotation probability in the change of engineering quantity is positively related to the cost savings of Party A's failure to identify the unbalanced quotation,and the party's agent accepts the amount of the bribe,and the party's agent identifies the unbalanced quotation or The contingent loss of the state-owned assets funded by Party B and the loss h2,the future income x caused by the change in the amount of engineering identified by Party A is negatively correlated.The probability that Party A's agent and Party B will consolidate public assets funds is positively related to the amount of bribes and audit fees received by Party A's agents,and is negatively related to the incentives obtained by auditors for investigating problems.In order to prevent the Party A agent and Party B from conspiring to seek public assets funds in the project,they can start from the employment of the agent of Party A,the quality of the auditors,and increase the incentives for auditors to investigate and punish.