期刊文献+

溢出确定时单边随机R&D企业的收购策略 被引量:2

Takeover Strategy for the Unilateral Stochastic R&D Firm When Spillovers are Certain
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摘要 在一个双寡头市场中 ,一个企业从事成本降低型R&D。R&D结局是随机的 ,但R&D成功时非创新企业获得的溢出是确定的。创新企业可以在进行R&D之前或之后收购竞争者 ,分别称为事前收购和事后收购。本文对事前收购和事后收购两种策略进行了对比分析。结果表明 ,当R&D溢出较大时创新企业将选择事前收购 ,而溢出较小时将选择事后收购。值得注意的是 ,创新企业选择的收购方式同时也使消费者剩余和R&D投资达到最大。最后指出 。 In a duopoly market,one firm conducts cost-reducing R&D. R&D outcome is stochastic,yet the non-innovating firm gets certain spillovers from successful R&D.The innovating firm may take over its either before or after the R&D activities are conducted.The corresponding takeover polices are called ex-ante takover and ex-post takeover,respectively.This paper makes a comparison between ex-ante takeover and ex-post takeover.It is shown that,the innovating firm chooses ex-ante takeover for large spillover and ex-post takeover for small spillover.It is remarkable that the takeover policy chosen by the innovating firm also maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus. Finally,it is pointed out that no takeover is never the innovating firm's optimal policy.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 2002年第4期9-12,共4页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目 ( 70 0 710 16 )
关键词 研究 发展 收购方式 溢出 COURNOT竞争 收购兼并 单边随机R&D企业 收购策略 research and development(R&D) takeover spillovers Cournot competition
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参考文献7

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同被引文献36

  • 1蔡宁,吴结兵.产业集群组织间关系密集性的社会网络分析[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2006,36(4):58-65. 被引量:37
  • 2刘卫民,陈继祥.内生溢出与R&D竞争、合作的激励问题[J].管理工程学报,2006,20(3):1-5. 被引量:25
  • 3侯光明,艾凤义.基于混合溢出的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理工程学报,2006,20(4):94-97. 被引量:57
  • 4李金华.基于复杂网络理论视角的产业集群网络特征浅析[J].江苏商论,2007(1):46-47. 被引量:5
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  • 7D' ASPREMONT C, JACQUEMIN A. Cooperative and Non -cooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum I-J]. American Economic Review, 1990, 80 (3): 641-642.
  • 8SUZUMURA K. Cooperative and Non - cooperative R&D in Oligopoly with Spillovers [J]. American Economic Review, 1992, 82 (5) : 1307 - 1320.
  • 9SUZUMURA KOTARO. Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers [ J ]. The American Economic Review, 1992, 82 (5): 1307-1320.
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