企业集团内部团队生产的最优激励机制研究

Research on the Optimal Incentive Schemes of Team Production Within Enterpris Group

本文提供了企业集团内部团队生产的多代理人模型 ,从激励的角度分析了模型的解及其特征 ,重点讨论了帮助努力对设计最优激励契约的影响 ;在此基础上 ,获得了团队工作是最优的充分条件 ;最后 ,就所有权因子的激励与扭曲效应进行了阐述 。

This paper provides a multi-agent model on team production within enterprise group, analyzes the model's solution and its characteristics from the incentive view, and emphatically discusses the influences of helping effort on designing the optimal incentive contract. Based on that, a sufficient condition for team work to be optimal is obtained. Finally, the incentive and distortion effects of ownership coefficient are demonstrated, and it's pointed out it's the distortion effect that causes the low-efficiency possibility of team production.