招投标中的激励机制设计

The Incentive Mechanism Design in Bidding

本文应用博弈论中的不完全信息博弈理论与信息经济学中的激励机制理论 ,探讨了招投标过程中业主与承包商之间的激励机制的设定问题 ,建立了承包商的合理报价模型。本模型建立在业主对承包商施加参与约束与激励约束的基础上 ,承包商可根据这一模型进行合理、科学的报价 ,从而实现甲乙双方“双赢”的目标。

Based on applying the incomplete information Game Theory and Incentive Mechanism Theory, this paper discusses the question on how to state the incentive mechanism between owner and contractor in the course of bidding and inviting for bidding, and constructs a reasonable model. This model is established on the basis of the owner's exercising restriction and incentive on the contractors. The contractors can offer a reasonable and scientific quote so as to realize the target of win-win.