期刊文献+

存款保险理论分歧及其理性思考 被引量:17

Different Theories on Savings' Safety & Rational Thinkings
下载PDF
导出
摘要 存款保险理论研究长期以来一直存在着两种相互对立观点 :支持者认为存款保险能够消除挤兑均衡 ,而且在防止挤兑和银行危机方面具有无法替代的功能 ;反对者则怀疑存款保险是否能够彻底消除挤兑 ,认为这一制度可能降低了存款人对银行的约束 ,弱化了银行竞争力 ,进而影响到该制度本身绩效。本文通过对这两种不同观点的理论进行综合分析 ,发现其分歧在本质上不过是一个问题的两个方面。任何市场化国家 (我国也不例外 )都不能回避存款保险制度 ,但这一制度的作用发挥还有赖于降低逆向选择、道德风险和委托 -代理成本 ,有赖于提高制度监管环境和市场约束机制的水平。
作者 何光辉
出处 《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2002年第10期61-66,共6页 Shanghai Journal of Economics
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

  • 1[1]Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor,"Self-interested Bank Regulation",AER May1993,Vol. 83. NO. 2P206-212
  • 2[2]Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale,"Optimal Banking Crises" ,Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1998,p1245-1284.
  • 3[3]Diamond,Douglas W. and Rajan,Raghuram G. ,"Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation,and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking" ,Journal of Political Economy, April2001,109(2), p287-327.
  • 4[4]Diamond, Douglas W. and Dybvig,Philip H. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,and Liquidity",Journal of Political Economy ,June 1983 ,Vol. 51 ,No. 3 ,p401-19.
  • 5[5]Cull,Robert. "How Deposit Insurance Affects Financial Depth:A cross-country Analysis,Policy Research Working Paper 1875,World Bank,January 1998".
  • 6[6]Demirguc-Kun,Asli and Detragiache,Enrica, "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability?", IMF Working Paper,2000.
  • 7[7]Keeley,Michael. "Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking",American Economic Review,December 1990,Vol. 80,No. 5,p1183-1200.
  • 8[8]Matutes, Carmen, and Xavier Vires. "Competition for deposit ,fragility,and insurance",Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1996 ,Vol. 2 No. 5 ,p184-216.
  • 9[9]Bhattacharya, Sudipto, Arnoud W. A. Boot, Anjan V. Thakor, "The economics of bank regulation", Journal of Money,Credit,and Banking,1998,Vol. 4 No. 30,p745-70.

同被引文献71

引证文献17

二级引证文献39

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部