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关于共同补货期的供应链库存控制模型 被引量:2

A supply chain inventory control model through common replenishment epochs
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摘要 文中提出设计一种共同补货期 (CRE)的机制用于供应链库存控制 ,分析了合作性供应链库存带来的优势。在这种机制下 ,供应商规定共同的补货期 ,要求所有的购买者必须在这个期间内订货 ;供应商提供一个价格折扣以诱使购买者按受这种策略。通过解一个Stackelberg博奕模型求出供应商最优的补货期和价格折扣值。 This paper proposes a mechanism to analyze the benefit of coordinating supply chain inventories through the use of common replenishment epochs.Under the propose mechanise,the vendor offers a price discount to entice the buyers to accept this mechanism.The optimal replenishment period and the price discount to be offered by the vendor are determined as a solution to a Stackelberg game.
出处 《华东经济管理》 2002年第5期55-57,共3页 East China Economic Management
关键词 共同补货期 供应链 库存控制模型 stacklberg博奕 企业 supply chain management inventory control stackelberg game
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参考文献5

  • 1[1]Chueng,K.L.,Hau L.Lee.Coordinated Replenishment in a Supply China With Vendor-managed Inventory Programs[M].Working Paper,The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,Clear Water Bay,Hong Kong,1999.
  • 2[2]Sven Axsater,Wen-Fa Zhang. A joint replenishment policy for multi-echelon inventory control[J].International journal of Production Economics,1999,(2).
  • 3[3]Goyal,S.K..A one-vendor multi-buyer integrated inventory model:A comment[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1995,(82):209-210.
  • 4[4]Lu,L.A one-vendor multi-buyer integrated inventory model[J].European Journal of Operational Research,1995,(81):312-323.
  • 5[5]Viswanathan,S.Coordination in supply chains:On price discounts,Stackelberg game and joint optimization[M].Working Paper,Nanyang Business School,Nanyang Technological University,Singapore,2000.

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