摘要
国有企业难以全面振兴的深层次原因是 :国民收入分配格局变化后 ,财政从生产建设财政转变为借债吃饭型财政后 ,它们失去了资本金注资来源 ,而银行注资形成的高负债发展模式 ,又会形成金融风险 ;工资成本上升趋势和资本利润率下降规律同样在国有企业发生作用 ,冗员过多的工资上升侵蚀利润 ,使国有企业难以为继 ;将企业作为一级党政社团组织办和企业办社会 ,使企业的体制成本很高 ,并内化了许多社会成本 ;所有者多头代理 ,导致管事的不管人 ,管人的不管事 ,所有者的权力、责任和应当承担的风险不对称。从放权让利改革开始的所有权和经营权的分离 ,虽然扩大了企业的自主权 ,但是没有形成真正管用的所有者 ,且形成了更多的不负责任的所有者代表。后来企业资产多元化的改革 ,希望通过外力来建立所有者 ,国有资产管理搭便车 ,然而由于种种原因 ,效果并不理想。从战略上讲 ,国有经济要集中 ,要社会化 ,要在许多领域退出。但是 ,国有经济所占资源目前仍占全社会经营性资源的 70 %以上。并且 ,国有经济并不可能在短期内得以转轨。因此 ,需要在过渡时期建立一种有效的出资人—经营者制衡制度 ,使国有企业在国民经济中发挥应有的作用。
The causes of difficulties to vigorously develop state-owned enterprises (SOE) are: financial system was transferred from production and construction into debt after changes of national income distribution, SOEs lose capital inflow, and banks' inflow capital become high debt model and later on involved financial risk; cost of wage increase and rate of capital profit decrease are appeared in SOEs, uprising of surplus labor cost erodes profit that makes SOEs to be difficulty to remain; enterprises run by party, administrative, social institutions or society run by enterprise lead to high cost of the system, and internal consumption of much social cost; multiple representatives of owners to people who run affairs do not manage personnel while people who manage personnel do not run affairs, the authority, responsibility and risk to be undertaken are incongruous. Enterprise reform started from deregulation and profit-remained, although separation from ownership and management enlarged enterprise's authority, the effective owners do not exist, more and more non-responsible representatives are come out. Later on, reform of multiple investors carried out, hopefully external resources would build owners, but the outcome is unsuccessful. From the strategic point of view, section of state-owned economy should be concentrated and socialized and should be withdrawn from many industries. However, resources currently occupied by SOEs account for over 70% of the total social businesses. Moreover, state-owned economy is impossible to be transferred during the short period. So it is necessary to build an effective investor system-operator restriction and balance during the period of transformation in order to make SOEs play an important role in the national economy.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第11期5-14,共10页
China Industrial Economics
基金
中共中央党校"大型企业提高核心竞争力体制环境"研究成果的一部分
关键词
国有企业
出资人
国有资产管理委员会
state-owned enterprise
investor
commission of state-owned assets management