会计信息的软法规制——以不完全契约理论为视角

Soft Law Regulation of Accounting Information——From the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory

会计信息是各企业契约缔约方相互合意之产物,同时又是一系列基础契约的契约标准,具有契约属性。然而高昂的预见成本、缔约成本以及证实成本,使其逐渐成为不完全契约。以新兴的软法对其进行规制,可部分缓解会计信息产生过程中的有限理性、信息不确定以及机会主义行为。软法规制通过引入多方主体参与,培养自我约束意识,软硬兼施,能够在一定程度上解决硬法的困境,从而降低规制成本,克服双重失灵,最终输出高质量的会计信息。

Accounting information is enterprise contract which is mutually desirable products of all parties.At the same time,it is the standard of a series of basic contract.So it has the character of contract.However,high predicted costs,contracted costs and confirmed cost make it an incomplete contract.The regulation of the new soft law can partly alleviate the limited rationality,information uncertainty and opportunism behavior in the process of accounting information production.Through the regulation of multi subject participation,the cultivation the awareness of self-discipline,soft law can solve the plight of hard law in a certain extent,thereby reduces the cost of regulation,overcomes the double failure,outputs the high quality of accounting informationfinaliy.