地方政府部门的过度职务消费:组织同构理论的视角

Excessive Position-Related Consumption in China’s Local Governments:An Organizational Isomorphism Perspective

从20世纪80年代以来,中国政府就开始关注职务消费当中的奢侈浪费现象,并一直努力尝试约束政府部门的过度职务消费。但是直到2012年,过度职务消费一直没有得到根本的改善。职务消费似乎只是一件小事,但是如果政府连职务消费都无法有效治理,那么其治理能力就会受到质疑与挑战。为什么过度职务消费的治理这么难?本文从组织同构理论出发,探讨过度职务消费深层次的制度原因。通过分析地方政府过度职务消费的案例,本文讨论同构压力的来源,同构压力如何影响官员的行为,以及同构压力如何得以持续。基于与65个政府官员的深度访谈以及相关政府文件和媒体报道,本文认为在中国科层组织内的同构压力可能已经被制度化了,并导致违背法律法规的非正式制度盛行。本文最后简要分析十八大以来反腐败实践对政府官员职务消费行为的影响。

The Chinese government has paid attention to official extravagance in the position-related consumption since the 1980 s and made intensive endeavor to discipline and penalize such behavior.Nevertheless,the effort had hardly been effective until 2012.It will become a big challenge to the governance capacity if the government is unable to curb and prevent official extravagance.Why is it so difficult to overcome excessive position-related consumption?Based on organizational isomorphism,this study investigates the institutional forces contributing to official extravagance.Particularly,it discusses the sources of isomorphic pressures,the impact of isomorphic pressures on the behavior of government officials,and the sustaining mechanisms of the pressures.Based on the evidence from65 interviews with government officials,relevant official decrees and media reports about position-related consumption,this study finds that isomorphic pressures upon position-related consumption have been institutionalized in the Chinese bureaucratic context,leading to the prevailing practice of extravagance which significantly deviates from the formal rules and regulations.Finally,this study briefly explores the impact of the anti-corruption reform after 2012 on position-related consumption.