期刊文献+

美国财产保险公司的破产成本分析与启示 被引量:2

The Cost of Property-Casualty Insurance Company Failures in the USA
原文传递
导出
摘要 加强保险业以及保险公司自身风险管理的基本出发点就是防止公司破产。随着我国保险业的快速发展和加入WTO后市场竞争的加剧 ,这一问题将日益突出。鉴于国内相关数据的缺乏 ,本文主要利用美国的文献与数据 ,分析了有关产险公司破产成本的几个重要问题。研究发现 ,产险公司的破产成本非常高 ,以净成本比率衡量达到 1 0 0 % ,远高于银行业的 3 0 %的水平。影响破产成本的主要因素包括 :公司的规模、资本化比率、长尾业务的比重以及是否为灾害事件导致公司破产。分析还表明 ,产险公司破产成本高昂的主要原因来自负债业务方面。 The fundamental purpose of risk management and regulation in insurance industry is to prevent insurance company failure, which will become a serious problem after China's entry into WTO. For the lack of domestic data, we use the literature and data from the USA to analyze the cost of property-casualty (P&C) insurance company failures. Our research imply that the costs incurred by guarantee funds to resolve insurance company insolvency are remarkably high--about 100 percent of the book value of assets, while the same ratio in bank industry is only about 30 percent. The determinants of P&C insurance company insolvency costs are company assets size, the ratio of book value of capital to assets, the fraction of long-tail lines, and whether firm bankruptcy is disaster-triggered. We also find that high failure cost of P&C insurance company is mainly because of liability aspect.
作者 孙立明
出处 《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2002年第10期69-80,共12页 Journal of Financial Research
关键词 财产保险 风险管理 破产 成本 美国 保险公司 WTO 中国 资本化比率 灾害事件 property-casualty insurance, risk management, company failure, cost
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

二级参考文献38

  • 1Mayers D and C.W.Smith, 1988,"Ownership Sructure Across Lines of Property-casualty Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics ,63,19-40.
  • 2Mookerjee, D. and Png, I., 1989, "Optimal Auditing, Insurance and Redistribution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104,205-228.
  • 3Meier, Kenneth J., 1988, The Political Economy of Regulation : The Case of Insurance, Albany, NY : State University of New York Press.
  • 4Mossin,J., 1968, "Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, "Journal of Political Economy ,79,553-568.
  • 5Neumann,J.Von and O. Morgenstem, 1947, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.
  • 6Pratt,J., 1964,"Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large", Econometrica,32,122-136.
  • 7Rothchild, M. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1976," Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:The Economics of Markets With Imperfect Information,"Quarterly Journal of Economics ,90,629-650.
  • 8Rubinstein, A and M. E. Yaari, 1983," Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, 30,74-97.
  • 9Shavell, S., 1986," The Judgement Proof Problem ,"International Review of Law and Economics,6,45-58.
  • 10Spence, M. and R. Zeckhauser , 1971 ," Insurance, Information and Individual Action ," American Economic Review,61,380-387.

共引文献42

同被引文献11

引证文献2

二级引证文献5

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部