摘要
我国上市公司的盈余操纵行为已对证券市场的信誉形成强烈冲击。盈余操纵风险主要由盈余操纵的动机、机会、发现概率和惩罚力度四“因子”组成。因此 ,要有效地抑制盈余操纵行为 ,必须通过合理的制度设计 ,构筑起综合的、多层面性的防范和治理体系 ,削弱其动机 ,减少其机会 ,提高其发现概率和惩罚力度。
The listed firms' earning manipulation has spoiled the prestige of capital market. The risk of earning manipulation consists of motivation, opportunity, exposure probability and degree of punishment. We should design a rational system which can weaken its motivation, diminish its opportunity, increase its exposure probability and punishment degree in order to restrain the listed firms' earning manipulation.
出处
《四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第6期122-126,共5页
Journal of Sichuan University:Philosophy and Social Science Edition
关键词
上市公司
盈余操纵
制度经济学
listed firm
earning manipulation
institutional economics