信息不对称与中小企业信贷支持——兼析中小企业信贷市场中的政府作用

On Information Asymmetry and the Credit Support to the Medium-sized and Small Enterprises--Analysis on the Function of the Government in the Credit Markets for Medium-sized and Small Enterprises

通过建立一个银行对中小企业信贷的博弈模型 ,说明当市场上低风险企业过少 ,高风险企业过多时 ,银行不能通过贷款收益收回自己的风险类型鉴别成本。在不可能提高投资项目自有资本比例 ,而利率放开有待时日 ,极易加剧道德风险的情况下 ,银行无法改善其收益小于成本的处境。因此 ,从中小企业信贷市场退出是银行的最优选择。最终指出 ,为了促进中小企业的发展 ,建立一个由国家提供部分担保、商业性银行发放贷款的中小企业信贷体系对支持中小企业发展、健全完善的金融体系是可能的 ,也是必要的。

This paper states that by setting up a gaming mode for a bank to offer credit to medium sized and small enterprises,a bank can not recover its discrimination cost of risk type when there are fewer enterprises with low risk and much more enterprises with high risk.The best choice for the bank is to with draw from the credit markets for the medium sized and small enterprises.The paper points out that in order to promote the development of mdeium sized and small enterprises,we think it necessary and practicable to set up a credit system guaranteed by the state finance and issued by the business banks so as to perfect the financial system.