论民主政治中的委托—代理关系

Principal-agent Theory in Representative Democracy

与经济活动中的委托—代理模型一样,在民主政治中客观存在着委托—代理关系,由于激励不相容、信息不对称和权责不对等,代理人可能采取追求自身利益的机会主义行为,从而产生权力变异、腐败滋生、效率低下和内部人控制等问题,损害委托人的利益。因此,改革代议民主制的思路包括:进行良好的宪政安排,建立完善的激励、监控和沟通机制,将代议民主制与直接民主制适当地结合起来,等等。

The principal\|agent problem exists objectively in the representative democracy just as in the economic activities. Agent resorts to the opportunism behavior seeking self benefits because of incompatible incentive, asymmetric information, inconsistency of power and accountability, it occurs such problems as the power alienation, corruption, inefficiency, internal control and so on,which infringing upon the principal's benefits. Therefore, it's emphasized that carry on a good constitution arrangement, institute a perfect mechanism of incentive, constraint and communication, properly combine representative democracy with direct democracy are the effectively reforming measures.