董事会规模强制规制模式的解释与反思

Interpretation and Rethinking of Mandatory Regulation Mode towards Size of the Board

源自国企特殊的领导干部职数限制的规定,经由单向的路径依赖扩展适用至所有类型的公司,进而演变为董事会人数区间的强制性规范,是一个带有深刻计划经济思维及其理念的陈旧制度安排,不仅违背市场经济体制要求,而且由于其难以具有一项强制性规范的基本禀赋,带给公司自治、司法救济与行政执法等领域一系列的法律规范适用困惑。董事会的规模可能是公司根据所面临的内外市场环境所做的一种反应,公司会本着'成本—效益原则'自主选择一个最适合自身的规模及结构,公司法对其规制不仅要注意强度的合理性,而且在规制路径上也有比强制规制人数区间更优的选择。

Originating from the state-owned enterprise,the specific regulation of which imposing restriction on the number of leadership positions,has experienced the course of change from an unidirectional path dependence to the one that applicable to all types of corporations,and futher evolved into a peremptory norm which governs the size of the board.As an obsolete institutional arrangement with a deep imprint of thoughts and philosophy of planned economy,it not only goes against the system of market economy but also brings a bunch of obfuscation in application of legal norms in the areas of corporate autonomy,judicial relief and administrative law enforcement for the absence of a basic endowment of peremptory norm.The scale of the board may be a reflection of a corporate practice in response to the internal and external market environment.Corporation is able to make an independent choice upon its scale and structure which suits itself the most based on the'principle of cost-effectiveness'.In addition to paying attention to the intensity of its regulation,corporation law shall notice that there are better choices on the regulatory path other than merely put forward a mandatory regulation on the size of the board.