摘要
民商合一体例下,我国《民法总则》吸收了大量的团体法思维。职务代理是团体自治对外发生效力的媒介制度,凭此媒介团体才能参与法律上之交易。为了充分发挥职务代理之功能,要构建起职务代理规则的适用体系。以契合其内在价值——团体自治和交易安全作为评判标准,选择"区别说"采有因性原则作为职务代理规则体系的基础理论,以此确定授权行为是职务代理权之权源。同时,通过论证职务代理类型化的正当性,以类型化思维结合基础理论解释《民法总则》第170条。"法人与非法人组织"应狭义解释为"私法人与非法人组织";职务代理权应类型化为经理权与代办权,经理权的范围是经营团体业务所必要的一切行为,代办权范围是完成相应职务所必要的一切行为,且经理权与代办权范围的认定规则均具有习惯法之效力;本条第2款中"职权范围之限制"应等同于内部指示,该款为职务代理权滥用之规则。
Under the legislative form of combination of civil law and commercial law, the 'General Principles of the Civil Code' in our country absorbs a great deal of organization law thinking. Agency In Duty is a media system for organization autonomy taking affect, only by this system organization can participate in transaction. In order to give full play to the functions of Agency in Duty. It is necessary to construct a rule application system of 'Agency in Duty'. This article meets the organization autonomy and transaction security as the evaluation criteria, selects the 'differentiate theory and the principle of causation' as the basic theory, determines the source of agent’s power which is authorization, justifies the legitimacy of typed ' agency in duty', and explains Article 170 of the 'General Principles of the Civil Code' with typological thinking. The explanation of the rule concludes that 'legal persons and non-legal person organizations' should be narrowly interpreted as' private legal persons and non-legal person organizations'. Classifying the 'Agency in Duty' into the manager’s power and the ordinary agent’s power, the author respectively establishes the rules for identification of the scope of the manager’s power and the scope of the ordinary agent’s power. The author thinks the rules have effect of customary law. The limits of the scope of agent’s power should be equal to the internal instructions,and the paragraph 2 of this article is the rule of the abuse of agent’s power.
作者
徐深澄
XU Shencheng(China University of Political Science and Law)
出处
《法学家》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期97-110,194,共15页
The Jurist
关键词
职务代理
商事代理
经理权
意定代理
团体自治
Agency in Duty
Commercial Agency
Manager’s Power
Commission Agent
Organization Autonomy