信息不对称下互联网借贷序贯博弈研究

Study on the Sequential Game of Internet Lending Against Information Asymmetry

通过系统梳理分析我国互联网借贷现状表明,民营系互联网借贷平台金融风险最高,银行系互联 网借贷平台风险最低,而影响互联网借贷平台风险水平的重要原因之一则是其对借款人信息掌握的准确性。 据此构建考虑借款人信息的序惯博弈模型,对互联网借贷平台、借款人和贷款人之间的相互博弈策略进行推 理分析。结果表明互联网借贷平台掌握全面准确的借款人信息,有助于其降低核查成本和提高盈利水平,同 时也有助于提高借款人还款和贷款人出借资金的概率。

Through the systematic analysis of the current situation of Internet lending in China, it is shown that the private Internet lending platform has the highest financial risk, and the Internet lending platform of bank has the lowest one. One of the important reasons for affecting the risk level of Internet lending platform is the accuracy of borrowers’ information. On this basis, the sequential game model incorporating borrowers’ information is constructed, and the mutual game strategy between the Internet lending platform, borrowers and lenders is analyzed. The result shows that the Internet lending platform acquiring the comprehensive and accurate borrowers’ information, can help reduce the verification cost and improve the profitability, and help improve the probability of borrowers’ repayment and lenders’ lending funds.