监管竞争能促进合作吗?——来自经典公共品实验的证据

Can Competitive Supervision Promote Cooperation?——Evidence from Classical Public Goods Experiments

行政监管是解决公共品领域合作难题的重要手段,但在执法环节由于监管腐败和监管懈怠等原因可能导致监管失灵,难以取得理想的监管效果。因此,如何应对监管执法环节失灵?如何促进监管效果?成为迫切需要解决的理论难题。论文在公共品实验中引入三种监管情境,考察监管竞争对合作行为的影响,结果发现:(1)在监管垄断情境下,监管对合作行为的促进效应逐渐减弱;最终,被试在监管垄断和无监管情境下的合作行为没有显著差异。(2)在监管竞争情境下,监管对合作行为的促进效应逐渐增强,最终的合作行为显著高于无监管、监管垄断情境。(3)在监管环节引入竞争,可以促进监管者的客观监管严厉性及被试对监管严厉性的主观预期。(4)在实验初期,监管严厉性以及严厉性预期在监管竞争对合作行为的影响关系中没有发挥中介作用;但随着实验的推进,监管严厉性以及严厉性预期发挥了中介作用。上述研究结论在公共品、合作行为以及行政监管的研究领域贡献了新理论知识。

It is generally believed that administrative regulation is an important means of solving the problem of cooperation in the field of public goods.However,achieving an ideal effect is difficult due to slack supervision or corruption or both.Promoting efficient supervision has become an important theoretical problem.This article introduces the concept of competitive supervision into the classical public goods experiment to examine the impact of competition on cooperation.The results show that:(1)Undermonopolistic regulatory supervision,the positive effect of regulation on cooperative behavior gradually weakens.However,there was no significant difference in cooperative behavior between subjects in supervised monopoly and non-supervised situations.(2)In the context of regulatory competition,the positive effect of regulation on cooperative behavior was gradually strengthened.Cooperative behavior was significantly higher compared to the non-regulatory and regulatory monopoly context.(3)Introducing competition into supervision can promote supervision severity and subjective expectations on supervision severity.And,(4)Inthe early stages of the experiment,the regulators objective supervision severity and the subjects subjective expectations for supervision severity didn t play an intermediary role in the relationship between supervision competition and cooperation.However,by the end of experiment,the regulators objective supervision severity and the subjects subjective expectations of supervision severity played an intermediary role.The above conclusions contribute new theoretical knowledge to the field of public goods,cooperative behavior,and administrative regulation.