摘要
如何从自然主义或唯物论的角度刻画规范性,是当代哲学的许多领域都共同关心的议题。徐英瑾提出,唯物论所需要的规范性理论,就是将其刻画为“功能实现的完成度”。这样既肯定了规范性是自然律和因果性存在的逻辑衍生物,同时又保证其相对独立性。然而,对规范性的功能主义解释将不可避免地深陷于“结构”与“行动”的不平衡关系,在呈现人类的理性能动性方面有所缺漏。一种更为优越的规范性理论,将不能仅仅奠基于一般的唯物论视角,而须以历史唯物论的眼光处理个体与整体、结构与行动之间的张力关系。
It is one of the common issues among contemporary philosophy on how to conceptualize normativity from a naturalistic or materialistic view.Xu Yingjin argues that normativity in a materialistic view is characterized as the completeness of some functional realizations.It implies that,for one thing,the normative things derive logically from laws of nature and causality;for the other,those could be elucidated in a relatively independent way by some normative terms.However,the functionalistic account of normativity could not appropriately resolve the relationship between structures and actions,and could not illustrate the whole of rational agency either.It seems that a more plausible account of normativity would depend not on a materialism in general sense,but particularly on the historical materialism,which would propose a better solution on the tensions between individualism and holism,and between structures and actions.
出处
《哲学分析》
CSSCI
2019年第4期3-14,196,共13页
Philosophical Analysis