考虑消费者偏好和政府干预下光伏供应链质量决策

Quality Decision of PV Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference and Government Intervention

运用博弈论的方法,考虑消费者存在质量偏好的情况下,研究政府干预是否会对光伏供应链在不同决策情形下的质量水平和产能产生影响。分析结果表明:政府在一定范围内设置惩罚系数可以减少落后产能,增加先进产能,若惩罚系数设置不合理也会导致高效产能退出市场;供应链合作的决策条件最有利于产品质量的提高,而集成商合作的决策条件最不利于产品质量的提高。

Using the game theory method and considering the existence of quality preference of consumers,a study is conducted on whether or not government intervention will have an impact on the quality level and production capacity of photovoltaic supply chain in different decision-making situations.The analysis results show that the government can reduce backward production capacity and increase advanced production capacity by setting penalty coefficient within a certain range.However,if the penalty coefficient is not set properly,it will also lead to the withdrawal of efficient production capacity from the market.The decision conditions of supply chain cooperation are most favorable to the improvement of product quality,while the decision conditions of integrator cooperation are most unfavorable to the improvement of product quality.