企业质量控制的演化博弈分析——基于供给侧改革的背景

The Analysis of Evolution Game Model of Quality Control within Enterprises——under Background of Supply Side Reform

供给侧改革背景下企业要积极参与推进自身供给侧改革,即企业内部的质量控制。对企业而言质量控制的实质就是品管部与生产部相互博弈的过程。由于信息不对称与有限理性,生产部违规生产屡见不鲜。针对此类问题,利用演化博弈论分析品管部与生产部的关系,构建两者非对称演化博弈模型,研究两者在质量控制过程中的策略选择问题,并进行Matlab仿真,利用模型指导实际工作。研究结果表明生产部的心理成本、惩罚额度、监管力度、品管部的监管成本四个参数值变化会影响生产部违规的概率以及品管部监管的策略选择。根据研究结果,同时借鉴日本企业的全面质量管理制度,本文从组织设置、部门职能、管控方法方面给出供给改革侧背景下企业加强质量监管的建议。

Under the background of supply side reform,enterprises should actively participate in promoting their own supply side reform,that is,quality control within enterprises.For enterprises,the essence of quality control is the game between the quality control department and the production department.However,due to information asymmetry and limited rationality,An illegal production of the production department is common.For such problems,using evolution game theory to analyze the relationship between quality management department and the production department,the model is constructed base on asymmetric evolutionary game Between them.Game analysis studies the selection of strategies in enterprises quality control,and using Matlab simulate the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model when different parameters change,and using the model to guide the actual work.The results show that the change of the four parameters of the psychological cost,Amount of punishment,regulatory strength and the regulatory cost of the quality management department will affect the probability of illegal behavior of the the production department and the policy choice of the regulatory authorities.Finally,the paper gives some suggestions to strengthen the enterprises quality regulatory from the aspects of organizational setup,department functions and control methods,so as to suppress the occurrence of quality problem under background of supply side reform in the field of enterprises.we can draw lessons through the analysis of the comprehensive quality management system of Japan enterprise.