研发外包中的技术转移效率研究——不完全契约视角

Research on Technology Transfer Efficiency in R&D Outsourcing:Incomplete Contract Perspective

研发创新已经成为当今企业核心竞争力重要来源,但研发外包为何没有象制造业外包那样普遍?从不完全契约理论的视角看,研发外包契约存在较强的不完全性特征是研发外包发展受限的主要原因之一,而事后技术转移效率是影响研发外包契约效率的一个重要方面,因此,如何尽量避免缔约方在事后向对方敲竹杠是提升事后技术转移效率的关键。通过建立事后技术转移的数学模型分析敲竹杠行为发生的机制及其影响,认为研发外包契约事前确定的技术许可费用和产权分配方式是决定事后敲竹杠行为是否发生以及发生后影响大小的关键因素。其中,技术许可费用的设定有固定价格和灵活价格两种模式,即刚性契约和柔性契约,通过分析,事前签订柔性契约可以相对提高事后技术转移的效率;在产权安排上,委托方拥有创新技术的知识产权可以降低事后机会主义行为的概率。

R&D innovation has become an important source of core competitiveness of enterprises,but why R&D outsourcing is not as common as manufacturing outsourcing?From the perspective of incomplete contract theory,the strong incompleteness of R&D outsourcing contract is one of the main reasons for the development constraints of R&D outsourcing,and the efficiency of technology transfer after the event is an important aspect affecting the efficiency of R&D outsourcing contract.Therefore,how to avoid the parties ripping off each other after the event is the key to improve the efficiency of technology transfer after the event.The mechanism and influence of bamboo poaching are analyzed by establishing a mathematical model of technology transfer after the event.It is considered that the technology licensing fee and the way of property rights allocation determined beforehand in R&D outsourcing contract are the key factors to determine whether the bamboo poaching occurs after the event and the size of the impact after the event.Among them,the setting of technology licensing fee has two modes:fixed price and flexible price,namely rigid contract and flexible contract.Through analysis,signing flexible contract beforehand can relatively improve the efficiency of technology transfer afterwards;in the property right arrangement,the intellectual property right of the principal owning innovative technology can reduce the opportunism afterwards.The probability of being.