不同情境下京津冀大气污染治理的“行动”博弈与协同因素研究

Study on the ‘action’game and synergy factors of air pollution control in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei under different situations

我国区域大气污染治理模式主要分为属地治理与合作治理两种,合作治理已成为解决京津冀大气污染难题的共识。但从已有的治理效果而言,资源禀赋、经济结构、“政治位势”差异等引致的非对称利益博弈,使京津冀三方在治理进程中往往会偏好于不同的行动策略,呈现为个体理性与集体理性的动态性重复博弈。基于地区利益博弈视角与联防联控行动逻辑探索实现“常态化”跨域协同治理的动态演化路径,是实现京津冀大气污染有效治理的战略要求与必然选择。针对当前京津冀大气污染治理实情,构建无、有中央政府约束下属地治理与合作治理“行动”博弈模型,探讨各方主体行动选择的演化路径与均衡策略。运用数值模拟方法比较无、有中央政府约束下各类协同因素变动对京津冀大气污染合作治理联盟达成与巩固的影响,考察实现稳固性协同治理的动态演化均衡机制。研究发现:在属地治理模式下,无论中央政府是否实行约束,京津冀三方均倾向于选择“搭便车”策略,这将可能导致“诸侯治理”与“约束失灵”的两难困境;在合作治理模式下,基于共同发展利益目标,京津冀三方会更有效地选择合作治理策略,但存在基础条件差距所引致的行动“滞后性”问题,中央政府差异化约束是平衡地区发展差距、缩小行动策略“滞后区间”的有效保障。因此,京津冀三方要积极借助中央政府宏观约束措施的引导,建立健全信息共享机制、监督约束机制、利益分配机制、成本分摊机制、生态联动绩效机制等,通过生产技术创新、产业结构优化、新能源应用等途径全力挖掘提升合作治理收益、降低合作治理成本的潜力,以促进本辖区治理效益提升基础上的有效互动。同时,中央政府要基于京津冀三方的治理收益、成本差异,进一步研究如何以适当的约束措施与调控力度融入各类协同因素的调整过程,巩固京津冀“常态型”合作治理联盟的稳定性。

China’s regional air pollution governance modes are mainly divided into two types:territorial governance and cooperative governance,and cooperative governance has become the consensus to solve the problem of air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei.However,from the perspective of existing governance effects,due to the asymmetric game of interest caused by resource endowment,economic structure,and‘political situation’,the three parties of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei tend to prefer different action strategies in the governance process,which is presented as a dynamic repeated game of individual rationality and collective rationality.Strategic requirement and inevitable choice to realize the effective governance of air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei are as follows:based on the perspective of game of regional interest and the logic of joint defense and joint control action to explore the dynamic evolution path of‘normalized’cross-domain collaborative governance.Considering the current situation of air pollution governance in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,this paper discusses the evolution path and equilibrium strategy of all parties’action choices by constructing an‘action’game model of territorial governance and cooperative governance whether the central government imposes restrictions.The numerical simulation method is employed to compare the impact of change of various synergistic factors,whether the central government imposes restrictions on the achievement and consolidation of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei air pollution cooperative governance alliance,and to explore the dynamic evolutionary equilibrium mechanism for achieving stable collaborative governance.The study found that under the territorial governance model,regardless of whether the central government imposes restrictions,three parties of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei all tend to choose the‘free-riding’strategy,which may lead to the dilemma of‘feudatory governance’and‘constraint failure’;under the cooperative governance model,three parties of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei will choose the cooperative governance strategy more effectively based on the common goal of development and interest,but there is a problem of‘lag’caused by the gap in the basic conditions.The central government’s differential constraint is effective guarantee to balance the regional development gap and narrow the‘lag interval’of action strategy.Therefore,three parties of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei should actively use the guidance of the central government’s macro-constraints to establish and improve information sharing mechanisms,supervision and restraint mechanisms,interest distribution mechanisms,cost sharing mechanisms,and ecological linkage performance mechanisms,and fully explore the potential of enhancing the benefits of cooperative governance and reducing the cost of cooperative governance through production technology innovation,industrial structure optimization,new energy applications and other ways,in order to promote effective interaction based on the improvement of governance benefits in their jurisdiction.The central government should further study how to integrate the adjustment process of various types of synergistic factors with appropriate restraint measures and degree of regulation based on the differences in the governance benefits and costs of three parties of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,and consolidate the stability of the‘normalized’cooperative governance alliance of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei.