管理者任期对创新战略选择的影响——以内部控制作为调节变量

The Influence of Manager Tenure on Innovation Strategy Selection——Internal Control as the Regulating Variable

以2013-2016年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,运用高层梯队和委托代理等理论,研究管理者既有任期以及预期任期与创新战略的关系,并讨论内部控制在两者之间的调节作用。研究发现:管理者任期越长,企业越倾向于选择探索式创新战略;内部控制在管理者预期任期与探索式创新战略的选择中起正向调节作用;区分产权性质后,正向调节作用在国有企业与非国有企业中存在异质性。延长管理者任期、完善内部控制制度等是企业创新战略的重要举措。

Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of China from 2013 to 2016 as samples,this paper studies the relationship between the existing tenure and expected tenure of managers and innovation strategy,and discusses the moderating effect of internal control between the two by applying the theories of high-level echelon and principal-agent.The research finds that the longer the tenure of managers,the more inclined enterprises are to choose exploratory innovation strategy;internal control plays a positive regulating role in the selection of managers’expected tenure and exploratory innovation strategy;after distinguishing the property right nature,there is heterogeneity between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Therefore,extending managers’tenure and improving internal control system are important measures of enterprise innovation strategy.