摘要
现象学(特别是胡塞尔与梅洛-庞蒂)提供了当代哲学中关于具身性最为重要且最富影响力的解释,这包括区分“身体”和“躯体”与讨论肉身间互动的本质。人类的具身性是感知、概念、动觉能力的基础。本文则主要是聚焦于胡塞尔与梅洛-庞蒂,讨论具身性与能动性的现象学,以阐明身体的不同存在样态(身体与躯体)、身体在触觉中的独特构造(回返性),以及身体与性别、想象、幻觉等经验之中的关系,从多个维度系统地阐述了现象学的身体理论。
Phenomenology(especially that of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty)provides the most important and influential account of embodiment,including the distinction between“body”and“lived body”,and on the nature of interactions between bodies(intercorporeality),in contemporary philosophy.Human embodiment is the basis of our perceptual,conceptual,voluntary,and motor capacities.This paper primarily focuses on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,and discusses phenomenology of embodiment and agency,so as to elucidate different types of bodily existence(lived body and physical body),the peculiar constitution of the body in touch(i.e.,reversibility),and the relationship between body and sexuality,imagination,illusion,with the aim of explaining phenomenological theory of the body from various perspectives.
出处
《深圳社会科学》
2019年第5期31-47,156,共18页
Social Sciences in Shenzhen
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“《马克斯·舍勒全集》翻译与研究”(项目号17ZDA033)
广东省社科基金青年项目“现象学视阈下的社会认知研究”(项目号GD18YZX01)的阶段性成果