摘要
缴费不实是我国社会保险费征管中存在的弊病,它可能受财政分权体制的影响。本文基于2008—2016年中国上市公司微观数据和宏观统计数据,实证考察了财政分权对企业社会保险缴费不实的影响效应及其作用机制。研究发现:财政分权度加剧了企业社会保险缴费不实程度,财政分权度每提高1个百分点,企业社会保险缴费不实程度提高0.31个百分点。中介机制检验表明,财政分权度主要通过社会保险征收力度这一中介变量,影响企业社会保险缴费不实程度。财政分权度越高,地方政府降低社会保险征收力度的动机越强,企业社会保险缴费不实程度也越高。进一步分析发现,财政分权对企业社会保险缴费不实的影响受经济周期的干扰,经济紧缩期财政分权对企业社会保险缴费不实程度的影响效应要大于经济扩张期。本文为解释企业社会保险缴费不实提供了新的视角和经验证据,也为进一步推动企业社会保险逃费治理和社会保险制度优化提供了政策启示。
False contribution payment is a drawback of social insurance enforcement in China,which may be affected by the fiscal decentralization system.Based on the listed companies micro-data and macro statistics data from 2008 to 2016,this paper empirically examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on false corporate payment of social insurance contribution and its mechanism.The research finds that fiscal decentralization exacerbates the degree of false corporate social insurance contribution,and when the degree of fiscal decentralization increases by 1 percentage point,the latter would increase by 0.31 percentage point.The impact mechanism test shows that the fiscal decentralization affects the degree of false social insurance contribution payment mainly through the intermediary variable of enforcement strength.The higher the degree of fiscal decentralization,the stronger incentives local governments have to loosen the enforcement intensity and the higher the level of degree of false corporate social insurance contribution is.Further research finds that the impact of fiscal decentralization on the degree of false corporate social insurance contribution is affected by the economic cycle.The effect of fiscal decentralization during economic contraction on the degree of false corporate social insurance contribution is greater than during economic expansion.This paper provides a new perspective and empirical evidence for explaining false corporate social insurance contribution,as well as policy implications for further regulating corporate social insurance evasion and bettering the social insurance system.
作者
鲁於
冀云阳
杨翠迎
LU Yu;JI Yunyang;YANG Cuiying(Nanjing Medical University,211166;Guangdong University of Finance&Economics,510320;Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,200433)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第9期146-160,F0003,共16页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金“基于就业促进和生活保护的社会保险制度费率调整与保障功能优化研究”(71673176)
国家社会科学基金重点项目“渐进式延迟退休年龄政策研究”(16ASH013)
关键词
社会保险缴费不实
企业逃费
财政分权
征收力度
False Payment of Social Insurance Contribution
Social Insurance Evasion
Fiscal Decentralization
Enforcement Strength