摘要
本文以2001-2016年我国A股上市公司数据为样本研究发现:首先,全样本下内部资本市场活跃程度对大股东掏空行为的影响存在区间效应。然后,采用双重差分模型研究2007年《物权法》对大股东掏空行为的影响。发现《物权法》颁布后,大股东掏空行为得到显著改善;同时,《物权法》颁布能够协同内部资本市场改善大股东掏空行为,进而验证了《物权法》的间接外部治理效应。这些结果说明,《物权法》颁布具有反掠夺效应,为进一步完善《物权法》、促进证券市场监管提供了理论参考。
Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2001 to 2016,we found there is range effect towards the relationship between the active level of internal capital market and the tunneling behavior of big shareholders.Then,we employ difference-in-difference model to study the impact of Property Law published in 2007 on the tunneling behavior of big shareholders,we found the tunneling behavior of big shareholders has significantly decreased after the publish of Property Law.Meanwhile,the Property Law limit the positive relationship between the active level of internal capital market and the tunneling of big shareholders,which in turn verified the indirect external governance effect of the Property Law.These results suggest that the Property Law has anti-predatory effect,which provides theoretical reference for further improving the Property Law,promoting the supervision of the securities market.
作者
祁怀锦
万滢霖
陈欣
Qi Huaijin;Wan Yinglin;Chen Xin
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期43-65,共23页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
财政部2017年“会计名家培养工程”项目“《物权法》、内部资本市场与反掠夺效应”(资助文件编号:财政部财会[2017]26号)的资助
关键词
《物权法》
内部资本市场
大股东掏空
Property Law
Internal Capital Market
Tunneling of shareholders