没有同一性就没有实体吗？——斯特劳森对奎因的回应

No entity without identity?——Strawson’s response to Quine

奎因将同一性理解为事物不同名称间的外延关系,强调其作为殊相归纳基础和共相排除依据的功能,提出了倾向于理论优位的“没有同一性就没有实体”。斯特劳森基于经验确认的语言实践,质疑“同一性标准”的有效性、客观性和严格性,进而提出以“同一性原则”和“可分辨事物的非同一性”为内核的“相对同一性”。通过概述奎因和斯特劳森对实体与同一性关系的理解,并结合《个体:论描述的形而上学》来阐释“相对同一性”对“殊相确认”的本体论意义。

Quine takes identity as extensional relations between different names of the same object,stresses its functions as inductive basis to particulars and exclusive groundings for the general,and proposes the slogan“no entity without identity”.Strawson sets his basis on the linguistic practice of empirical identification,challenges the concept of“criterion of identity”regarding its validity,objectivity and strictness,and proposes a relative identity doctrine focus on“principle of identity”and“non-identity of discernible”.This paper will sketch their positions and end with discussions on the ontological values of relative identity by combining the discussions with Individuals.