辩护格林式实验伦理学的规范性价值

A Defense of the Normative Value of Green’s Experimental Ethics

辨析关于格林式实验伦理学的规范性价值的批评,可以发现,这些批评不仅是无效的:关于大脑信息加工方式、道德判断类型与大脑区域三者无法稳定对应的批评是无效的;而且批评的方式也不正确:平行论证被过度使用、“可靠”被过度理解、格林式实验伦理学的论证被割裂或关键信息被忽略。该事实反而说明,基于批评者难以否认的道德直觉构造出的论证,可以证成格林式实验伦理学具有规范性价值。

By analyzing the criticism of the normative value of Green’s experimental ethics,we can find that these criticisms are ineffective,i.e.,the criticism of the nonstable correspondence between the way of processing brain information,the type of moral judgment and the brain region.Moreover,the way of criticism is not correct:parallel arguments are overused,“reliable”is overly understood,Green’s experimental ethics is fragmented or the key information is ignored.Based on the arguments constructed by the moral intuition which critics cannot deny,it can be proved that Green’s experimental ethics has normative value.